by: Robert A. Ballinger, Attorney at Law, Director of Operations, Kings River Title and Abstract

At the heart of most judicial opinions is the question of statutory interpretation. Arkansas law requires courts to apply statutes as they plainly read. For example, the court in Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., declared neither the “exigencies” of a case, nor a “resort to extrinsic facts,” will be permitted to alter the meaning of the language used in the statute. Thus, when a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court is primarily concerned with what the document says, rather than what its drafters may have intended. In Bishop, a consumer purchased furniture by executing a sales contract with an interest rate of fifteen percent. The consumer filed an action against the lender, credit council, and retail merchants association, alleging that the contract was usurious. The court declared the statute was clear and unambiguous and held that the contract was void as to the unpaid interest because it had an interest rate in excess of the lawful rate.

Similarly, in Williams v. Little Rock School District, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the use of extrinsic facts when the words of the statute are clear. Williams, a school teacher, informed his principal that he wished to resign. The following morning, Williams asked if he could withdraw his resignation. The principal informed Williams that the administration officials had already decided to accept his resignation. As a result Williams sued in an effort to be reinstated. The court found that there was nothing in the language of the statute that either expressly or impliedly stated that the remedy of an appeal to circuit court was applicable to cases involving a disputed resignation. The statute allowed for any nonprobationary teacher, aggrieved by a decision made by the board, to appeal the decision to the circuit court of the county in which the school district is located. Teacher and district may introduce additional testimony and evidence on appeal to show facts and circumstances indicating that the termination or nonrenewal was lawful or unlawful. The court declared that the statute’s purpose was to protect teachers’ jobs from arbitrary and capricious actions committed by the school district, it was not to protect teachers from their own actions.

When examining an issue of statutory construction, Arkansas’s cardinal rule is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, Arkansas determines legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. Where the meaning is unclear, Arkansas looks to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject.

Federal law also requires a court to look first at the plain meaning of a statute. For example, in the United State Supreme Court case of Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., the Court stated, “[i]t is enough that [the legislature] intended that the language it enacted would be applied as we have applied it. The remedy for any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies with [the legislature] and not with this Court. [The legislature] may amend the statute; we may not.” In Griffin, a seaman brought an action against his former employer seeking wages he was entitled to by statute upon his discharge. The Court held that district courts did not have the discretion to limit the period during which the wage penalty was assessed, and that the imposition of the penalty was mandatory for each day that payment was withheld in violation of the statute.

Griffin also declared that legislative intentions should only be controlling “in rare cases” where the literal application of the statute will produce results demonstrably at odds with the intent of its drafters. The Court reserved “some scope for adopting a restricted rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words where acceptance of that meaning . . . would thwart the obvious purpose of the statute.” The Court also noted that if a court resorts to interpretation of legislative intent, the statute should be considered as a whole, and the language should not be interpreted in a manner that leads to “absurd consequences.”